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With the growing environmental crisis affecting our globe, ideas to weigh economic or social 
progress by the ‘energy input’ necessary to achieve it are increasingly gaining acceptance. 
This question is intriguing and is being dealt with by a growing number of studies, focusing 
on the environmental price of human progress. Even more intriguing, however, is the question 
of which factors of social organization contribute to a responsible use of the resources of our 
planet to achieve a given social result (‘smart development’). In this essay, we present the 
first systematic study on how migration – or rather, more concretely, received worker 
remittances per GDP – helps the nations of our globe to enjoy social and economic progress 
at a relatively small environmental price. We look at the effects of migration on the balance 
sheets of societal accounting, based on the ‘ecological price’ of the combined performance of 
democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and 
development, and social cohesion. Feminism in power, economic freedom, population density, 
the UNDP education index as well as the receipt of worker remittances all significantly 
contribute towards a ‘smart overall development’, while high military expenditures and a 
high world economic openness are a bottleneck for ‘smart overall development’. 
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1. Introduction 
With the growing environmental crisis affecting our globe, ideas to weigh economic or social 
progress by the ‘energy input’ necessary to achieve it are increasingly gaining acceptance. 
This question is already intriguing enough and is being dealt with by a growing number of 
studies in different disciplines, including environmental economics, geography, political 
science and sociology, focusing on the environmental price of human progress. Geography, in 
particular, seems to be pre-destined to focus on the processes and indicators of sustainable 
development (Sénécal – Hamel 2001;). 
 
A highly relevant question is which factors of social organization contribute to a responsible 
use of the resources of our planet. In this essay, we will present the first systematic study on 
how migration – or rather, more concretely, received worker remittances per GDP – helps or 
hinders the nations of our globe to enjoy social and economic progress at a relatively small 
environmental price. We look at the effects of migration on the balance sheets of societal 
accounting, not based on such variables as democracy, economic growth, gender equality, 
human development, research and development, or social cohesion, but at the ‘ecological 
price’ of the combined performance in democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
development, research and development, and social cohesion. 
 
If anything, the 21st century we live in is a century of the simultaneity of the problems we 
face. Environmental destruction and climate change happens at an unprecedented scale, as 
does the phenomenon of mass migration on a global scale. Scholary disciplines might know 
their strict borders, but the problems of today cannot be neatly separated into different 
compartments, and at the end of the day, there are no limits between ‘environmental 
problems’ and ‘migration’, while there are still strict limits between ‘environmental 
economics/sociology’ and ‘economics/sociology of migration’ at the departments of social 
science around the globe and in scholarly journals, publishing their output. 
 
Even at the risk of overburdening our readership, which might be perhaps not yet really 
accustomed with the new terminology of ‘environmental accounting’ of global development, 
we have to introduce some of this terminology already at the very beginning of the paper in 
order to be able to better explain what this essay is all about. The idea to express 
‘development’ in relationship to the energy needed to sustain it, is a new approach in social 
sciences. As development theory has become more and more ecological in recent years, we 
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have to arrive at measures, which ‘price’ economic progress in terms of the environmental 
inputs needed to sustain it. The idea of an environmental pricing of progress receives a 
powerful support from the following logic: among all the available global measures about 
environmental destruction, the ecological footprint is perhaps the most dramatic one. It 
measures how much land and water area a human population requires to produce the 
resources it consumes and to absorb its carbon dioxide emissions, using prevailing 
technology.2 Even reading this article requires the use of natural resources. The ecological 
footprint is usually measured in global hectares. Existing time series allow us to grasp the 
extent of the accelerating environmental constraints facing our globe.3 In 1961, the richer, 
industrialized countries, grouped together in the OECD, had an ecological footprint of 3.6 
global hectares per capita, while by 2005 this had increased to 6.0 global hectares per capita. 
In 1961, just 4.2 global hectares per capita would have been necessary in the OECD to sustain 
a good life expectancy of 80 years of age, while in 2005 the ‘environmental price’ of 80 years 
life expectancy in the OECD had increased to 6.1 global hectares per capita. In poor nations, 
such as Haiti, Bangladesh, Congo, Malawi, Tajikistan, Nepal, or the Philippines, one global 
hectare per capita or less of ecological footprint would be needed to sustain a life expectancy 
of 80 years of age, while in Luxembourg, the United States of America, the United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand, Iceland, Estonia, Canada, Norway, 
Ireland, Botswana, Greece, Uruguay, Namibia, Spain, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, Belgium, Sweden, and Austria five or more hectares of ecological 
footprint per capita are needed to sustain a life expectancy of 80 years. With a relatively low 
environmental price of a footprint of 2.3 global hectares per capita, Costa Rica enjoys a life 
expectancy of 78.5 years, while in crisis-ridden Greece, a life expectancy of 78.9 years is 
bought at the heavy environmental and also economic price of 5.9 global hectares per capita. 
More and more political leaders and also mass media around the globe tend to refer to such 
experiences as the one in Costa Rica as ‘smart development’, while Greece and other ‘sinners’ 
along this scale are countries which have to make their development ‘smarter’. 
 
We provide our readers with cross-national data on how large ecological footprints are used 
in the nations of the world system to ‘deliver’ a given combined amount of democracy, 
economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, and 
social cohesion. 
2 For more details see: http://www.footprintnetwork.org/en/index.php/GFN/page/glossary/. 
3 See for example http://www.happyplanetindex.org/learn/download-report.html for an example of such time 
series. 
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 This is what we understand then as ‘smart development’, and from there we then move on to 
determine its possible ‘drivers’ and ‘bottlenecks’. The very idea of ‘smart development’ was 
first proposed by Meadows (1992) and has not been really followed up to now in social 
science ever since. In the face of the current huge usage of the term ‘smart’ in an 
environmental policy context in the international media, such a statement is perhaps 
surprising, but our verdict corresponds to the clear bibliographical evidence on the base of 
such indices as ‘ISI Web of Knowledge/Thomson Reuters’, ‘Scopus/SciVerse/Elsevier’ or 
‘Cambridge Scientific Abstracts/Proquest’.4 
 
In a similar vein, the Happy Planet Organization presented the so-called ‘Happy Planet Index’ 
(HPI), which is an index of measuring the trade-off between ecological footprint data and life 
quality (Happy Life Years, HLYE, i.e. life expectancy weighted by human happiness data, 
gained from standardized international public opinion surveys). Arguably, ecological footprint 
today is the best single international yardstick for environmental destruction in a nation (see 
also, in general terms, York – Rosa – Dietz (2003) and for a recent application in 
development geography Holden – Jacobsen (2009)).  
 
Economic theory, for sure, is conscious about the non-linearity of the trade-off between 
income and happiness, with rising income levels not necessarily increasing the happiness of 
all. This phenomenon has become widely known in the economic research literature as the 
‘Easterlin paradox’ (Easterlin 1995; 2001; Frey – Stutzer, 2002; Oswald, 1997; Stevenson – 
Wolfers, 2007). We show in our article how different standard predictors of international 
development accounting contribute to the explanation of the ‘smart development’ 
phenomenon. It turns out that worker remittances play an important role in this context. 
 
To address our research question, we first developed a UNDP-type performance indicator 
from current standard international comparative, cross-national social science data on what 
we see as the six main dimensions of development (democracy, economic growth, gender 
equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion) and provide a 
combined performance index on these six dimensions (a kind of super-UNDP ‘human 
development index’). We then analyse in non-linear standard OLS regression the trade-offs 
between ecological footprints per capita on the overall performance index. The residuals from 
4 Searching for the exact term ‘smart development’. 
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this regression are our new measure of smart development: a country experiences smart 
development, if it achieves a maximum of combined democracy, economic growth, gender 
equality, human development, research and development, and social cohesion with a 
minimum of ecological footprint.  
 
The independent variables, used in our research to explain performance along this new 
international scale of smart development in the first decade of the new Millennium range from 
standard social science cross national development accounting explanatory variables 
measuring the dimensions of feminism, demography, economic freedom, geography, 
dependency and world systems theories, to migration, convergence effects of poorer countries 
growing more rapidly than richer countries, Muslim population shares and membership of a 
country in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, military expenditures and military 
personnel rates, human capital formation, and participation in European economic and 
monetary integration.5 
 
These standard comparative cross-national data operationalize standard economic, 
sociological and political science knowledge in international development accounting. We 
compare the predictive power of all these standard predictors, using standard OLS stepwise 
regression procedures, weeding out the relevant from the irrelevant predictors of smart 
development. The final model is based on standard forward OLS multiple regression. The 
outcome of this exercise is our proof of the importance of worker remittances for ‘smart 
development’. 
 
In Chapter 2 we sketch a possible theoretical background. Chapter 3 will introduce the 
measurement concepts and the methodology of this essay. Chapter 4 will be dedicated to the 
presentation of the results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’, while 
Chapter 5 will discuss the results. Chapter 6 presents our preliminary conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
To present a theory or competing theories of ‘smart development’ is virtually impossible, 
because there has been no measurement, let alone accounting of its cross-national successes 
and failures in the literature up to now. We really had to start research into this issue from 
‘scratch’. For that reason, our survey of existing development theories has to be ‘inclusive’; 
5 Interested readers are referred to the quantitative data underlying our analysis. They can be downloaded freely 
at http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017 and http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383.  
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and the various competing development theories reflect themselves in the array of 
independent variables.6 
 
The economics profession studied for many years the weight of a very wide array of ‘drivers’ 
of economic growth (Levine – Renelt 1992). Empirical linkages between long-run growth 
rates and a variety of economic policy, political, and institutional indicators are often seen to 
be very fragile to even small changes in the conditioning information set. But there is a 
positive, robust correlation between growth and the share of investment in GDP and between 
the investment share and the ratio of international trade to GDP. The variety of relationships, 
tested in multiple regression analysis, is truly amazing and includes a wide range of predictors 
(see also Alesina – Spolaore – Wacziarg 2000; Dollar 1992a; 1992b; Edwards 1993; Frankel 
– Romer 1999; Rodrik 2006; Rodrik – Subramanian – Trebbi 2004; and World Bank 2005). 
While Dollar’s writings, widely disseminated around the globe, were especially 
straightforward in suggesting that a high share of exports and imports per GDP, and hence, an 
outward orientation of the society in question, is especially beneficial for economic growth 
and works in favour of the poorest strata of the population, the equally widely disseminated 
and received study by Frankel and Romer (1999), comes to a more cautious conclusion: 
examining the correlation between trade and income one really cannot identify the direction 
of causation between the two. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) further shattered the 
optimistic assumptions about the beneficial effects of world economic openness on 
development outcomes in their study about the respective contributions of institutions, 
geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently 
developed instrumental variables for institutions and trade. In his influential study, Rodrik 
(2006) Rodrik even went so far as to fundamentally question the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
based on open markets, which featured so prominently in Dollar (1992a and 1992b). 
 
Confronted with the recurrent stability of our research results, indicating a huge effect from 
worker remittances on ‘smart development’ variables, we decided to re-consider migration in 
our theoretical survey. As it is well-known, migration is part and parcel of the ‘four freedoms’ 
of capitalism, besides the freedom of goods, services, and capital. A particular earlier flagship 
survey of the hitherto existing migration theories (Masey et al. 1993) came to the pessimistic 
conclusion that migration theories up to that time were either advanced to explain the 
6 Interested readers are especially referred to the codebooks in pdf format, made available at 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017 and http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383, where the independent 
variables are described in detail. 
 6 
                                                          
initiation of international migration or put forth to account for the persistence of migration 
across space and time. Masey et al. suggested that, because they are specified at such different 
levels of analysis, the theories are not inherently logically inconsistent. As Taylor (2006) 
pointed out in his later, summarizing policy statement on the state of migration theory for the 
United Nations in 2006, indeed it would be foolish to exclude migration from any future 
discourse about global development: the number of international migrants has increased more 
or less linearly over the past 40 years, from an estimated 76 million in 1965 to 188 million in 
2005. The flow of international migrant remittances has increased more rapidly than the 
number of international migrants, from an estimated US $2 billion in 1970 to US $216 in 
2004. Nearly 70% of all remittances go to least developed countries (LDCs). Remittances 
were equivalent to 78% of the total value of exports in El Salvador and 108% in Nicaragua. 
As Taylor (1999) also pointed out in that worker remittances are especially affecting the less 
developed sending countries by the multiplier effect, well-known in economics since the days 
of John Maynard Keynes: $1 of remittances from international migrants may create $2-$3 or 
even more of new income in migrant-sending areas. One person’s spending is another 
person’s income. Even if all income in remittance-receiving households is spent on 
consumption, remittances may stimulate investments by the other households whose incomes 
go up (Taylor 2006: 9). The optimistic view about worker remittances is also supported in the 
well-received comparative international study by Ziesemer (2009). 
 
Migration is thus seen in many approaches as a win-win situation (Williamson 2002). For 
several observers, among them Hatton and Williamson (2009) the ‘current hysteria’ about 
inward migration in many industrialized countries has no real basis. For them, the Third 
World has been undergoing an emigration cycle since the 1960s, and, except for Africa, 
emigration rates have been level or even declining since a peak in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. The current economic crisis will serve only to accelerate those trends. Sanderson 
(2010) was one of the first consistent research attempts to bring in migration as a determining 
variable of social well-being. Contemporary levels of international migration in less-
developed countries are raising new and important questions regarding the consequences of 
immigration for human welfare and well-being. However, there is little systematic cross-
national evidence of how international migration affects human development levels in 
migrant-receiving countries in the less-developed world. The Sanderson paper addresses this 
gap in the literature by assessing the impact of cumulative international migration flows on 
the human development index, the composite, well-known UNDP measure of aggregate well-
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being. A series of panel data models are estimated using a sample of less-developed countries 
for the period 1970-2005. The results indicate that higher levels of international migration are 
associated with lower scores on the human development index, net of controls, but that the 
effect of international migration is relatively small. 
 
A vast body of literature in quantitative social sciences – especially in sociology and political 
science – develops sympathy with what could be loosely called ‘globalization critical’ 
movements across the globe and maintains that world economic openness, unlimited inflows 
of foreign direct investments, export orientation and the rest of the canon of the ‘Washington 
Consensus’. Among the most vociferous contributors to such kind of thinking was the 
Egyptian economist Samir Amin (1973; 1976; 1994; 1997a; 1997b) who combines in his 
writings, based in Marxian economics and Marxian value theory a theoretical expectation of a 
combination of negative results of ‘world economic openness’ for global development 
outcomes with insights into the detrimental role of Islamism in world society and a non-neo-
liberal critique of rent-seeking, and the positive role of transfers of international resources, 
brought about by large-scale migration from the periphery to the centre of the world system to 
the benefit of the countries of the periphery. All the factors mentioned in a scattered fashion in 
his numerous writings, i.e. the absence of openness, the role of the monopolies of powerful 
and big countries, the positive consequences of outward migration and the negative effects of 
rent-seeking, could be an important element in the accounting of the drivers of ‘smart 
development’.  
 
Reasons of space do not permit us to debate at greater length the very vast sociological, 
political science and economic theory literature, centred on subjects like the penetration of 
multinational corporations (MNC PEN)7 and economic and social development and its 
possible effects on the environmental situation. Our research duly acknowledges the possible 
effects, wielded by dependency and a peripheral role in the world system. In our brief 
summary of the empirical effects to be expected, we should rather concentrate, first of all, on 
7 MNC penetration is the key variable of most quantitative dependency and world systems theories, and it 
measures the weight that cumulated foreign capital investments have in the host countries, i.e. the percentages of 
the cumulated stocks of multinational corporation investments per total host country GDP. Bornschier and his 
school predicted a strong long-term negative determination of development by a high MNC penetration, due to 
the negative consequences monopolies have on the long term development trajectory of countries. The 10 
countries with the highest MNC penetration rate in 1995 were: Hong Kong, China (SAR), Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Equatorial Guinea, Vanuatu, Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Singapore, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago. The 10 least MNC-penetrated countries in the world were: Dominican Republic, Cyprus, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Cuba, Nepal, Kuwait, Belarus, Japan, Uzbekistan, and Bhutan. For more data see the UNCTAD table 
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2007_instock_gdp_en.xls. 
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what was actually predicted by Bornschier, Chase-Dunn and Rubinson (1978: 651), which 
must be regarded still as the most often quoted flagship study of empirical dependency theory, 
analyzing the effects of MNC PEN on economic growth and income inequality: 
 
(1) The effect of direct foreign investment and aid has been to increase economic inequality within 
countries. (2) Flows of direct foreign investment and aid have had a short-term effect of increasing 
the relative rate of economic growth of countries. (3) Stocks of direct foreign investment and aid 
have had the cumulative, long-term effect of decreasing the relative rate of economic growth of 
countries. (4) This relationship has been conditional on the level of development of countries. The 
stocks of foreign investment and aid have had negative effects in both richer and poorer 
developing countries, but the effect is much stronger within the richer than the poorer ones. (5) 
These relationships hold independently of geographical area.8 
 
More recently, there was also a real ‘growth industry’ of blossoming and booming 
dependency and world-system oriented studies of environmental problems. It has become 
really fashionable in many traditions of sociology and political science to blame the lack of 
‘sustainable development’ on globalization and the workings of ‘global capitalism’, perceived 
as a centre-periphery system. Such studies relied on a startling variety of environmental 
indicators. The coherent tendency of these studies, most notably Jorgenson (2003; 2004a; 
2004b and Blais 2000) would suggest that there could be a strong testable causal interaction 
between transnational capitalist penetration and environmental degradation, especially in third 
world countries.  
 
Our main independent variables and their theoretical linkages to explain ‘smart development’ 
are presented in Table 1. For a general analysis on all possible cross-national determinants of 
development, see also Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). 
 
Table 1. the independent variables of our model 
Independent variables, 
determinants of smart development 
Theories or earlier empirical studies using these variables 
% of women in government, all levels Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi (2009); Matt (2010)  
% of world population Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005); Amin 
(1973, 1976, 1994, 1997a, 1997b); Crenshaw and Robison (2010); 
8 However much the present authors might have shared dependency-oriented perspectives in the past, the 
interesting question under debate here is whether dependency – understood in the Bornschier tradition – is able 
to explain ‘smart development’. Our empirical research will show the dramatic paradigmatic shift in favour of 
migration and away from dependency theory, if we want to comprehend the ‘smart development’ phenomenon. 
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Kohr (1957); Ram (1997); Schumacher (1973a, 1973b) 
2000 Economic Freedom Score Alesina and Perotti (1994); Gwartney, Lawson, and Holcombe 
(1999); Helliwell (1994); La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer 
(1999); York, Rosa and Dietz (2003) 
Absolute latitude Easterly (2000); Poe and Tate (1994); Ram (1997) 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-
2005 (%) 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005); Crenshaw 
and Robison (2010); Ram (1997) 
Comparative price levels (US=1.00) Egert, Drine and Lommatzsch (2003); Faria and Leon-Ledesma 
(2003); Gould (2002); Kohler and Tausch (2001) 
Foreign savings rate Doucouliagos and Paldam (2008); Easterly and Schmidthebbel 
(1993); Feldstein (1994) 
FPZ (free production zones) 
employment as % of total population 
Chen (1995); Rondinelli (1987) 
Immigration, share of population 
2005 (%) 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003); Durlauf et al. (2008); Fain (1997); 
Fosu (2009); UNDP (2009) 
ln GDP per capita Barro (2000); Stern (2004) 
ln GDP per capita ^2 Barro (2000); Stern (2004) 
Membership in the Organization of 
Islamic Cooperation (OIC); Muslim 
population share per total population 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005); Haynes, 
(2001); Ram (1997); de Soysa and Ragnhild (2007) 
Military expenditures per GDP Auvinen and Nafziger (1999); Biswas and Ram (1986); Hamid 
(2007) 
Military personnel rate ln (MPR+1) Weede (1980, 1981, 1983) 
MNC outward investments (stock) 
per GDP; MNC PEN - stock of 
Inward FDI per GDP; MNC PEN: 
DYN MNC PEN 1995-2005 
Bornschier (1982, 2002) 
Net international migration rate, 
2005-2010 
Ehrhardt-Martinez, Crenshaw and Jenkins (2002) 
Openness-Index, 1990 (export-share 
per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
Dollar (1992a, 1992b); Frankel and Romer (1999); Rodrik (2006); 
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004); World Bank (2005) 
Population density Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005); Ram (1997) 
Public education expenditure per 
GNP; UNDP education index 
Blankenau and Simpson (2004); Glomm and Ravikumar (1997); 
Ram (1986); Scanlan (2004); Sylwester (2000); Weede and Kampf 
(2002) 
Worker remittance inflows as % of 
GDP 
Acosta, Calderon, Fajnzylber, et al. (2008); Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo (2004); Martin and Straubhaar (2002) 
Years of membership in EMU, 2010, 
Years of membership in the EU, 2010 
Allsopp and Artis (2003); Buti, Franco and Ongena (1998); de la 
Porte, Pochet and Room (2001); Egert, Drine and Lommatzsch 
(2003); Molle and Boeckhout (1995) 
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3. Methods and measurement 
To start with, we used a freely-available new cross-national comparative data set, which is 
freely available on the Internet (Tausch 2011a; 2011b). These electronic data sets offer 
Microsoft Excel data and lists of the international standard sources, and codebooks in pdf 
format. Tausch (2011a) also offers an Excel file with the combined UNDP type development 
performance index, on which this study rests. A brief description of the smart development 
data, calculated from these data sources is also contained in the Appendix of this work. 
 
So what is development? To gain a real empirical knowledge under scrutiny here, we first 
developed UNDP-type indicators from current standard international comparative, cross-
national social science data on six dimensions of development. We then investigated the non-
linear standard OLS regression trade-off between ecological footprint per capita and its square 
and the overall development performance indices. Smart and simple: the residuals from these 
regressions are our new measure of smart development: with a minimum of ecological 
footprint one has to achieve a combined maximum of democracy, or economic growth, or 
gender equality, or human development, or research and development, or social cohesion. 
These data are provided for in the Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
 
‘Smart development’, is mathematically derived from the ecological footprint and the logic of 
the Happy Planet Index (which compares Happy Life Years with ecological footprint; see also 
Ng, 2008a and 2008b; Veenhoven, 1996). Ecological footprint (global hectare per capita), as 
it is universally well-known by now, is a one-catch all-indicator of ecological strain, caused 
by human activity. Ecological footprint is a measure of the amount of land required to provide 
all resource requirements plus the amount of vegetated land to sequester (absorb) all CO2 
emissions and the CO2 emissions embodied in the products individuals consume. This figure 
is expressed in units of ‘global hectares’ (for studies about the logic and determinants of 
footprint per capita see also Dietz et al., 2007 and 2009). The variables combined and 
compared to the footprint, which were used by a society to achieve a given standard of 
development, included democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, 
research and development, and social cohesion. The exact variables are listed in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Measuring development 
democracy Combined Failed States Index 
democracy Civil and Political Liberties violations 
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democracy Corruption avoidance measure 
democracy Democracy measure 
democracy Global tolerance index 
democracy Rule of law 
economic growth Crisis Performance Factor 
economic growth economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2009 
economic growth economic growth IMF prediction growth rate in 2010 
economic growth economic growth in real terms pc. per annum, 1990-2005 
Gender equality closing economic gender gap 
Gender equality closing educational gender gap 
Gender equality closing health and survivial gender gap 
Gender equality closing of global gender gap overall score 2009 
Gender equality closing political gender gap 
Gender equality gender empowerment index value 
human development Infant mortality 2005 
human development female survival probability of surviving to age 65 female 
human development Human development index (HDI) value, 2004 
human development Life Expectancy (years) 
human development Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
R&D Country share in top world 500 Universities 
R&D per capita world class universities 
R&D tertiary enrollment 
social cohesion quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20% 
social cohesion unemployment rate 
Nonparametric index, using 26 
equal weights 
overall 26 development index 
 
Following Heintz (1972) we propose to calculate our smart development indicator as the 
standardized residuals from Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the trade-off between ecological 
footprint and ‘smart development’, combining the various dimensions (democracy, economic 
growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, social cohesion). 
The overall development performance is a clear non-linear, inverted U-shaped function of 
ecological footprint per capita. 
 
The standardized residual values are computed as observed minus predicted development 
outcomes divided by the square root of the residual mean square: 
 
σˆ/)ˆ( iii EHLYHLYESDP −=
        (1) 
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 High positive outliers imply a very high smart development performance, while countries 
below the trend line are the countries with a low smart development performance. Having 
established a residual-based smart Development Indicator family, we now can look more 
realistically at the cross-national determinants of smart development performance.  
 
Figure 1. Ecological footprint and general development performance 
 
Note: the figure shows the non-linear trade-off between ecological footprint per capita and a general 
development performance index, based on an equal weighting of its 26 components 
 
The choice of a country to be included in the final analysis (175 countries) was determined by 
the availability of a fairly good data series for these independent variables (if not mentioned 
otherwise, originally UNDP data for the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, all 
contained in Tausch (2011a, 2011b)). In the final regressions, we applied the ‘list wise 
deletion of missing values’ routine (i.e. only entering countries with complete data into the 
statistical analysis).  
 
The statistical design of our study is based on the ordinary least square standard regression 
analysis (using SPSS 17) of the ‘kitchen sink type’ of economic growth and economic, social 
and political performance in the research tradition of Barro (2003); Durlauf et al. (2008); 
Hertz, Hebert, and Landon (1994).9  
 
9 To our knowledge, the term ‘kitchen sink regression’, commonly used in the econometrics of economic growth, 
was re-introduced in more recent standard social science journal vocabulary by Laver and Shepsle (1999). 
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As we already mentioned in Table 1 of this article, our investigation duly acknowledged 
originally many of the key possible determinants of economic growth, mentioned in the 
economic literature, like current shares of the country’s inhabitants in total world population, 
calculated from UNDP data; the famous Heritage Foundation 2000 Economic Freedom Score; 
absolute geographical latitude, adapted from Easterly (2000; 2002; Easterly – Levine 1997; 
Easterly – Schmidthebbel 1993); the UNDP figures for long-term annual population growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (per cent); the trade-off between development level and development 
performance, otherwise also known in economics as ‘conditional convergence’ (ln GDP per 
capita; ln GDP per capita ^2); the simple Huntingtonian fact of whether a country is a Muslim 
country, to be measured by membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) or 
by Muslim population share (Nationmaster); UNDP data on the simple geographical fact of 
population density (based on the CIA’s World Factbook); UNDP data on public education 
expenditure per GDP; and the UNDP education index, combining the enrolment rates at the 
primary, secondary and tertiary education levels. We also take into account UNDP figures on 
military expenditures per GDP and the openly available CIA data on military personnel rates, 
which are key variables of contemporary political science, international relations theory and 
peace research. In our analysis, we also show the theoretical and practical (political) potential 
of the following two drivers of development, which are somewhat a ‘terra incognita Australis’ 
in the hitherto existing macro-sociological debate, like migration and European (Monetary) 
Union membership. Table 1 above already listed some of the very rich empirical literature, 
having been published on these issues in recent years. 
 
4. Results on the drivers and bottlenecks of ‘smart development’ 
The predictive power of our seven final variables, which wielded significant results in the pre-
tests, is enormous: 
1. Percentage of women in all levels of government 
2. 2000 Economic Freedom Score 
3. Military expenditures per GDP 
4. Openness-Index. 1990 (export-share per GDP + import-share per GDP) 
5. Population density 
6. UNDP education index 
7. Worker remittance inflows as percentage of GDP 
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These variables determine almost two fifths of global smart development. All other predictors 
were left out from the regression model. 
 
We can establish in Table 3 that in the 101 countries with complete data, ‘smart development’ 
is explained to 37% by our final model. The F-test for the entire equation is 9.392, the error 
probability is 0.000. The constant is -2.486 and is significant. The three countries of the world 
system, best combining the performance on our 26 development indicators and avoiding a 
large ecological footprint at the same time are the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Costa Rica. The 
three worst performers on this scale are Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Central 
African Republic. Feminism in power, economic freedom, population density, the UNDP 
education index as well as the receipt of worker remittances all significantly contribute 
towards a smart overall development, while high military expenditures and a high world 
economic openness are bottlenecks for smart development.  
 
Table 3. Drivers and bottlenecks of smart overall development 
Independent Variable B standard error Beta t-value error 
probability 
Constant -2.486 0.533  -4.666 0.000 
Women in government 
(%) 
0.025 0.012 0.185 2.027 0.045 
2000 Economic 
Freedom Score 
0.031 0.010 0.336 3.239 0.002 
Military expenditures 
per GDP 
-0.076 0.032 -0.191 -2.345 0.021 
Openness Index 1990  -0.004 0.002 -0.170 -2.007 0.048 
Population density 0.002 0.001 0.214 2.612 0.010 
UNDP education index 0.945 0.445 0.198 2.123 0.036 
Worker remittance 
inflows as % of GDP 
0.027 0.011 0.208 2.459 0.016 
Memorandum items: 
statistical properties of 
the equation 
adj R2 df F error 
probability of 
the equation 
 
 37.000 100 9.392 0.000  
Source: SPSS 17 calculations based on http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017  and 
http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2383 . 
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5. Discussion 
Our residuals-based analysis of the drivers and bottlenecks of smart development realistically 
capture the fact that feminism in power, economic freedom, population density, education, 
and the benefits from participating in a free or relatively free global migration regime are the 
drivers of smart development, while military expenditures and export orientation – as 
predicted by Brand et al. (2010) are the two main bottlenecks of combined smart 
development. 
 
In a sense, our results also contradict the logic, inherent in the ‘small is beautiful’ analysis, 
proposed by Schumacher (1973a): not the small countries, but countries with a high 
population density find it easier to have a satisfactory smart development performance in 
comparison to the ecological footprint created by them. Our research also shows the 
beneficial effects of migration on the sending countries. Worker remittances have a significant 
positive effect on smart development. Migration sending countries, as to be expected from 
both the ‘new migration theories’ and Samir Amin’s dependency theory (Amin 1973; 1976; 
1994; 1997a; 1997b), reap substantial benefits from receiving worker remittances, while other 
indicators of globalization hardly affect smart development performance. World economic 
openness on the other hand wields a significant negative effect, as expected by Amin’s 
dependency theory.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Since all existing major comparative empirical studies on drivers and bottlenecks of 
environmental quality only touched upon different dependent variables, and not smart 
development as such, this first international comparative study seems to suggest cautiously 
that future research efforts in comparative environmental science would be well advised to 
take the major predictor variables of the present study as well as the environmental plateau 
curve into account (see also Weede and Kampf 2002; de Haan, Lundstrom and Sturm 2006; 
and Gwartney, Lawson and Holcombe 1999).  
 
It emerges that the absence of ‘rent seeking’, economic freedom, and a free price mechanism, 
and worker remittances are the most important drivers of ‘smart development’. Most of the 
‘small is beautiful’ assumptions of Schumacherian economics by contrast do not stand the test 
of cross-national development accounting and are squarely contradicted by our empirical 
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results; with population density always being among the drivers, and not the bottlenecks of 
smart development.  
 
As correctly expected by Amin, peripheral rent seeking is a burden and its absence, measured 
by economic freedom, is an asset among the forces, shaping international development today. 
Amin correctly analysed the enormous transfer of resources from the centre to the periphery, 
brought about by migration, with the huge statistical observed effects of received worker 
remittances on smart human development, justifying his assumption. Amin’s dependency 
theory also correctly predicted the very negative effects of world economic openness on smart 
development.  
 
We could also show in this article the importance of feminism for smart development. We 
also investigated the negative effects of military expenditures on smart development.  
 
We are aware that our answers given to the questions raised in this article, are incomplete. But 
we hope to have provided at least some preliminary guiding posts for further research on this 
important subject, and to have shown that worker remittances are a positive asset for the 
labour sending countries in the emerging world economy. 
 
For the policy makers at the European level, who, with their ‘Europe 2020 strategy’, have set 
themselves the target of turning the EU into a ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive economy’, 
delivering employment, productivity and social cohesion, and that the EU meets five 
ambitious objectives in the fields of employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and 
climate/energy, our comparative data analysis shows that to meet such ambitious objectives, 
gender empowerment, economic freedom, investment in education, but also reaping the 
benefits of migration will play an important role in enhancing European performance. Some 
reservations against a too rapid pace of globalization are being vindicated in this article by the 
negative effects of export orientation on long-term smart development; and in addition, 
maintaining an era of détente in international relations is an important task for common 
European foreign policy: the negative effects of militarization on smart development are too 
clear to be overlooked. 
 
Thus our article could develop, we hope, some guiding posts for further research on this 
important subject. 
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Appendix Table 1. Global development – combining 26 indicators 
Based on international standard data, available from http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017, column AC and 
AD in EXCEL Table 1. Interested readers are referred to the extensive data codebook with all variable 
definitions, available in pdf format from this website. As with every index, like the Human Development Index, 
etc., one might endlessly argue about the components to enter as well as the weighting of the different 
components. It is important to underline in this context that the index is an attempt to arrive at a reasonable 
combination of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human development, research and development, 
and social cohesion. It is suggested that future research should look into the index construction by using different 
methodologies, including principal components etc. 
 
• Combined Failed States Index 
• Civil and Political Liberties violations 
• Corruption avoidance measure 
• Democracy measure 
• Global tolerance index 
• Rule of law 
• Crisis Performance Factor 
• economic growth IMF prediction growth 
rate in 2009 
• economic growth IMF prediction growth 
rate in 2010 
• economic growth in real terms pc. per 
annum, 1990-2005 
• closing economic gender gap 
• closing educational gender gap 
• closing health and survivial gender gap 
• closing of global gender gap overall score 
2009 
• closing political gender gap 
• gender empowerment index value 
• Infant mortality 2005 
• female survival probability of surviving to 
age 65 female 
• Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
• Life Expectancy (years) 
• Life Satisfaction (0-10) 
• Country share in top world 500 
Universities 
• per capita world class universities 
• tertiary enrollment 
• quintile share income difference between 
richest and poorest 20% 
• unemployment rate 
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Overall development index (based on 26 variables of democracy, economic growth, gender equality, human 
development, research and development, and social cohesion) 
      
Sweden 0.798 Ecuador 0.537 Maldives 0.432 
Norway 0.791 Nicaragua 0.536 Turkey 0.431 
Finland 0.781 El Salvador 0.535 Saudi Arabia 0.430 
New Zealand 0.774 South Africa 0.535 Georgia 0.429 
Denmark 0.752 Jamaica 0.534 Armenia 0.428 
United States 0.749 Cuba 0.531 Mozambique 0.428 
Switzerland 0.747 Colombia 0.528 Gambia 0.428 
Canada 0.738 Romania 0.528 Egypt 0.421 
Australia 0.737 Honduras 0.524 Nepal 0.420 
Netherlands 0.736 Dominica  0.522 Tajikistan 0.420 
Iceland 0.720 Kuwait 0.517 Tanzania 0.418 
United Kingdom 0.720 China 0.517 Timor-Leste 0.417 
Austria 0.713 Paraguay 0.515 Bangladesh 0.417 
Ireland 0.712 Macedonia 0.513 Papua New Guinea 0.413 
Germany 0.709 Bahrain 0.513 Malawi 0.412 
Belgium 0.706 Malaysia 0.512 Mauritania 0.411 
France 0.695 Fiji 0.509 Uganda 0.409 
Spain 0.684 Venezuela 0.506 Azerbaijan 0.408 
Israel 0.657 Cape Verde 0.504 Cambodia 0.399 
Costa Rica 0.654 Albania 0.504 Solomon Islands 0.398 
Japan 0.649 Tunisia 0.501 Seychelles 0.390 
Chile 0.647 Saint Lucia 0.498 Benin 0.387 
Slovenia 0.637 Bolivia 0.498 Mali 0.384 
Portugal 0.637 Samoa 0.498 Djibouti 0.371 
Italy 0.634 United Arab 
Emirates 
0.496 Kenya 0.368 
Luxembourg 0.634 Moldova 0.492 Comoros 0.367 
Panama 0.620 Lesotho 0.491 Ethiopia 0.366 
Greece 0.619 Botswana 0.491 Burkina Faso 0.364 
Poland 0.619 Guatemala 0.489 Libya 0.360 
Uruguay 0.617 Oman 0.488 Laos 0.355 
Cyprus 0.615 Namibia 0.488 Gabon 0.351 
Czech Republic 0.609 Vietnam 0.487 Pakistan 0.351 
Barbados 0.607 Qatar 0.486 Zambia 0.345 
Hungary 0.600 Sao Tome 0.480 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0.342 
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Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.597 Russia 0.478 Eritrea 0.336 
Slovakia 0.589 Ukraine 0.476 Myanmar 0.330 
Argentina 0.589 Ghana 0.476 Nigeria 0.326 
Mauritius 0.577 Belarus 0.474 Angola 0.322 
Philippines 0.577 Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
0.471 Cameroon 0.319 
Bahamas 0.576 Brunei 
Darussalam 
0.469 Yemen 0.319 
Estonia 0.572 Indonesia 0.468 Turkmenistan 0.318 
Mongolia 0.570 Jordan 0.468 Guinea 0.304 
Croatia 0.566 St. Kitts & Nevis 0.467 Congo  0.302 
Lithuania 0.561 Uzbekistan 0.461 Sudan 0.297 
Sri Lanka 0.561 Grenada 0.460 Chad 0.296 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.559 Senegal 0.458 Togo 0.288 
Malta 0.557 Kazakhstan 0.457 Niger 0.286 
Bulgaria 0.556 India 0.457 Congo (DCR) 0.278 
Suriname 0.556 Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0.456 Côte d'Ivoire 0.277 
Singapore 0.556 Kyrgyzstan 0.448 Haiti 0.277 
Latvia 0.556 Madagascar 0.446 Guinea-Bissau 0.276 
Korea (Republic 
of) 
0.556 Morocco 0.446 Equatorial Guinea 0.276 
Peru 0.555 Vanuatu 0.444 Rwanda 0.275 
Belize 0.553 Syria 0.443 Cen. African Rep. 0.255 
Guyana 0.550 Lebanon 0.442 Zimbabwe 0.252 
Brazil 0.545 Iran 0.438 Swaziland 0.251 
Mexico 0.544 Bhutan 0.436 Sierra Leone 0.248 
Thailand 0.543 Algeria 0.432 Burundi 0.238 
Hong Kong. 
China (SAR) 
0.539     
 
 25 
Appendix Table 2. Global smart development  
Based on international standard data, available from http://www.hichemkaroui.com/?p=2017. 
 
Smart development (z-standardized residuals of the combined values of 26 development indicators on ecological 
footprint and its square) 
 
      
Philippines 2.452 Morocco 0.581 Laos -0.435 
Sri Lanka 2.083 Ghana 0.559 Congo  -0.481 
Costa Rica 1.949 Brazil 0.547 Uruguay -0.508 
Sweden 1.817 Senegal 0.476 Paraguay -0.519 
Jamaica 1.687 Belize 0.466 Czech Republic -0.564 
Dominican Republic 1.560 China 0.438 Ukraine -0.571 
Finland 1.544 Georgia 0.433 Greece -0.612 
Peru 1.426 Ireland 0.417 Ethiopia -0.626 
Netherlands 1.409 Iceland 0.389 Mauritania -0.643 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.385 Bulgaria 0.375 Singapore -0.643 
Norway 1.264 Guyana 0.372 Angola -0.669 
Chile 1.240 Slovakia 0.332 Mali -0.687 
Switzerland 1.236 Hungary 0.280 Djibouti -0.705 
Germany 1.164 Poland 0.233 Yemen -0.705 
El Salvador 1.137 Jordan 0.232 Haiti -0.765 
United States 1.069 Cambodia 0.228 Myanmar -0.799 
Indonesia 1.047 Tanzania 0.222 Congo (DCR) -0.850 
New Zealand 1.037 Israel 0.218 Azerbaijan -0.923 
Moldova 1.020 Spain 0.204 Togo -0.979 
Argentina 0.998 Bolivia 0.200 Iran -1.021 
India 0.976 Portugal 0.183 Saudi Arabia -1.064 
Cuba 0.940 Slovenia 0.174 Botswana -1.075 
Malawi 0.932 Albania 0.172 Nigeria -1.092 
Vietnam 0.931 Croatia 0.105 Cameroon -1.097 
Colombia 0.880 Japan 0.104 Rwanda -1.105 
Bangladesh 0.867 Malaysia 0.099 Turkey -1.134 
Honduras 0.847 Lithuania 0.059 Namibia -1.185 
Austria 0.835 Uzbekistan 0.046 Guinea -1.292 
Denmark 0.792 Armenia 0.034 Lebanon -1.299 
United Kingdom 0.777 Benin 0.010 Estonia -1.303 
Panama 0.765 Luxembourg -0.010 Burkina Faso -1.312 
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Tajikistan 0.749 Italy -0.010 Russia -1.324 
Thailand 0.732 Mongolia -0.051 Kazakhstan -1.327 
Nicaragua 0.728 Romania -0.091 Macedonia -1.396 
Guatemala 0.694 Cyprus -0.122 Sierra Leone -1.400 
Belgium 0.692 Uganda -0.127 Belarus -1.445 
Nepal 0.689 Algeria -0.151 Hong Kong. 
China (SAR) 
-1.528 
South Africa 0.682 Latvia -0.218 Burundi -1.598 
France 0.650 Pakistan -0.224 Zimbabwe -1.750 
Kyrgyzstan 0.639 Zambia -0.226 Chad -1.827 
Madagascar 0.638 Kenya -0.287 Kuwait -1.887 
Canada 0.610 Mexico -0.288 Niger -1.888 
Bhutan 0.608 Egypt -0.294 United Arab 
Emirates 
-1.970 
Australia 0.598 Venezuela -0.302 Central African 
Republic 
-2.214 
Ecuador 0.597 Korea (Republic 
of) 
-0.390 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-2.381 
Mozambique 0.591 Malta -0.404 Sudan -2.512 
Tunisia 0.584 Syria -0.427   
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